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the union against non-strikers. 1° The moratorium statute established no
similar direct prohibition on the right of the non-striking collection agents.
The Hancock decision must rest upon the operational effect of the
moratorium statute on "free collective bargaining." The anticipated effect is
a "dialectically plausible" frustration of the national labor policy. However,
in finding a repugnance to that policy based on a speculative and potential
effect on free collective bargaining, the Hancock court extends the reach of
federal pre-emption under the NLRA. The thrust of the decision is to eliminate
any area of "peripheral concern" from state regulation where free collective
bargaining may be affected.
PAUL F. BEATTY
Labor Law—Municipal Pensions—Vesting of Rights.--Yeazell v.
CoPins. 1—Appellant Kenneth Yeazell'became a member of the police depart-
ment of the city of Tucson, Arizona, in 1941. At that time, the Police Pension
Act of 1937 2 was in effect, which provided, inter alia, that a pension amount-
ing to fifty per cent of the average monthly earning for the single year im-
mediately preceding retirement be paid to any policeman who had been in
the service of the city for twenty years or more!' The act included a com-
pulsory pensioner contribution of two per cent of each paycheck to the
pension fund, out of which payments were to be made. 4 In 1952 the act was
amended;' increasing the employees' compulsory contribution to five per cent
and providing that the pension payment would be calculated on the average
month's pay for the five years immediately preceding retirement.°
Upon Yeazell's retirement and application for pension in 1962, the
appellee Police Pension Board fixed his monthly cash benefit payment in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the 1952 amended act. His awarded benefits
were $7.21 per month less than they would have been if computed by the
terms of the original act,of 1937. 7 •
Yeazell then brought a class action for a declaratory judgment that the
amendment was unconstitutional and void as applied to himself and others
1 B Allen-Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Bell
Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
1 402 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1965).
Ariz. Code Ann, §§ 16-1801 to -1822 (1939).
;t
	 Code Ann. § 16-1808(b) (1939) provides:
Any member of the police department who has served such department twenty
(20) years in the aggregate may, upon application, be retired, and shall be paid,
(luring his lifetime, a monthly pension equal to one-half of the compensation
received by hirn . for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the date of
application for retirement. . . .
4
 Ariz. Code Ann. § 16-1807 (1939). Thal section further provided that if a
contributor terminated his employment before the twenty years elapsed, he would be
entitled to a refund of his contributions with 3 1./.,% interest.
5 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann, §§ 9-911 to -934 (1952).
11
 Ariz, Rev. Slat. Ann. §§ 9-923, -925(A) (1932).
Supra note 1, at 542.
380
CASE NOTES
similarly situated, and demanded that his pension benefits be computed by
the terms of the 1937 act. The lower court entered judgment for the defendant
Police Pension Board. The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed. HELD: A
public employee has a right to rely upon the terms of legislative enactments
in effect at the time he enters municipal service, and subsequent legislation
cannot in any way impair or modify these pension rights. These rights vest
upon commencement .of service as a part of the contract of employment,
and any attempted change of that statute must be prohibited as an attempted
unilateral modification of a firm and binding executory contract.
The court dismissed on state constitutional grounds the common law
and majority jurisdictions' view of the pension as a gratuitys and reasoned
that a contractual obligation was necessarily the foundation for a pension
payment authorized by the legislature. The dissenting opinion, although recog-
nizing a vested right in the retired employee to promised pension benefits,
rejected the idea that his claim was to a sum certain and maintained that the
claim was to a reasonable benefit prescribed by the pension statute in effect
at the time of retirement. The dissent argued for the implicitly reserved right
of a legislature to modify pension benefits when such modification is necessary
to preserve the integrity and actuarial soundness of the fund.
The states are unevenly divided between two mutually exclusive theories
as to the nature of municipal pensions. The majority jurisdictions hold the
common law view that the pensions are mere gratuities of the sovereign, con-
ferring no rights and establishing no duties," while the minority jurisdictions
treat the pension benefit as a matter of right, founded upon contractual obliga-
tion. 1° The extent to which these rights may be considered vested rights of the
pensioner and therefore immune to subsequent modification by the legislature,
however, varies among these latter states.
The Pension as a Gratuity. The common law and the majority of juris-
dictions consider the pension a gratuity, a manifestation of the generosity of
the state, a creature of legislative will and of public policy, which gives rise
to no rights in the pensioner and is terminable at the will of the grantor by
modification or total abrogation"—at least up to the time that the payments
are awarded and actually become clue and owing. 12
Pensions had their beginning in this country as an afterthought of the
Continental Congress in the nature of rewards to soldiers and seamen of the
Revolutionary War. 13 Recently, however, pensions have become more com-
8 The Arizona Constitution forbids gratuities. Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 7 (1956):
"Neither the State, nor any county, city, town, municipality, or other subdivision of
the State shall ever . . . make any donation . to any individual, association, or corpo-
ration. . „"
9 The cases collected in 52 A.L.R.2d 443-81 demonstrate that the gratuity theory
of pensions with no vested rights is clearly the majority opinion in the United States.
10 See, e.g., Dryden v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 6 Cal. 2d 575, 59 P.2d 104 (1936);
Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wash. 2d 695, 296 P.2d 536 (1956).
" Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937).
12 Retirement 11(1. of Allegheny County v. McGovern, 316 Pa. 161, 174 Ail. 400
(1934); Price v. Folsom, 168 F. Supp. 392, 398 (D.N.J , 1958).
13 United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 346-48 (1878). See generally 40 Am. Jur.
Pensions § 1 (1942).
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prehensive, and compulsory contribution by the potential pensioner to the
fund has become the rule. By most modern statutes all municipal employees
are required to become members of the existing pension system prescribed for
their department."
There seem to be two major objections to the gratuity theory of pensions
and its corollary of an unprotected pensioner. The first is the fact of com-
pulsory contribution to the fund by the employee. A long line of cases, how-
ever, avoids this objection on varying grounds. 1° The second objection arises
from a prohibition of gratuitous payments by the state which is frequently
found in state constitutions)° This objection is employed by the California
courts as a basis for their argument that pension rights are vested. These
California courts have clearly become the major proponent for the non-
gratuitous theory of pensions, treating them as a matter of right.'?
The Pension as a Matter of Right. Among the jurisdictions that treat
the pension as a vested right of the employee, significant variations are
found as to the nature, time of vesting, and the extent of that vested right.
The nature of the right is perhaps best termed contractual." The juris-
dictions which hold for vested pension rights seem to base these rights upon
the contract of employment with the pension considered part of the employee's
compensation, i.e., part of the consideration of that contract." One court
14 See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 108%, § 5-169 (1964); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:10-34 (1962);
Annot,, 52 A.L.R.2d 430, 442 (1957)
15 Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889), the parent case for the view that pension
rights rest upon legislative will, held that employees' payroll deductions for a pension
system were not in fact employee contributions, but merely public money transferred
from one public fund, payroll, to another, pension. That Court found controlling the fact
that the money was never reduced to the actual possession and control of the employee
and reasoned, hence; that it was never really his.
Anderson v. United States, 205 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1953) reiterated the policy that
governmental pensions
. , are not made a matter of right, or any less a gratuity, by virtue of the
fact that the payments are financed by payroll deductions, the rationale being
that the sums 'deducted' are never in fact paid . . the employees, but are
retained .. . as general public funds in which the employees can have no right.
Id. at 328.
Although social security retirement benefits are not the immediate subject of this
note, it is interesting to consider the language of Price v. Folsom, supra note 12;
It is a general rule that pension . . . payments . , . arc a gratuitous allowance
by the particular governmental body creating them. . . . [A] beneficiary . • .
does not acquire a vested right to any payments therefrom . . . whether the
payments to the fund are voluntary or compulsory.
The Social Security Act reserves the right to amend or repeal payments to recipients of
old age insurance in 49 Stat. 648 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964). For construction of
this section see Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922, 934 (D.D.C. 1959).
1°
 O'Dea v. Cook, 176 Cal, 659, 661, 169 Pac. 366, 367 (1917). This case is cited
by the present court as manifesting the antigratuity theory which it finds controlling.
Supra note 1, at 543-44.
17
 Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 444 (1957).
18 Anderson, Vested Rights in Public Retirement Benefits in Pennsylvania, 34 Temp.
L.Q. 255, 259 (1961).
1 ° O'Dea v, Cook, supra note 16, at 661-62, 169 Pac. at 367 states:
But where, as here, services arc rendered under such a pension statute, the pen-
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termed the pension "a product of mutual promises between the pensioning
authorities and the pensioner,"" and at least one state, by constitutional
amendment, makes membership in a pension system a contractual relation-
ship.2 ' The Supreme Court of Georgia puts great emphasis on the element of
employee compulsory, contribution as establishing the pension as a matter of
right.22
Although the point in time at which the right vests is generally not
treated independently in the cases, it may be useful to note the variations
among the jurisdictions. Most gratuity jurisdictions hold that a right to a
municipal pension never vests, even after it has been awarded. 23 The con-
tractual theory states hold, as a bare minimum, that the rights become com-
pletely vested upon completion of the prescribed conditions precedent in the
statute,24 e.g., twenty years' service and a minimum age of fifty. It has been
held that the pensioner's rights vest after partial completion of the conditions'
and even that the right to a pension becomes vested immediately upon ac-
ceptance of employment by the applicant."
Given a vested right to pension benefits, is the right so vested as to be
absolutely immune to any legislative modification, no matter how necessary
or desirable? Prior to Yeazell, even the contractual jurisdictions were in
general agreement that it was not. In California the "vested" right is subject
to subsequent legislative -modification 2 7 A similar philosophy is stated in
other contractual theory jurisdictions."
sion provisions become a part of the contemplated compensation for those
services, and so in a sense a part of the contract of employinent itself.
Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, supra note 10.
20 Hickey v. Pittsburg Pension Bd., 378 Pa, 300, 305, 106 A.2d 233, 235 (1954).
21 N.Y. Const. art. V, § 7 (1960) provides:
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil
division thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall
not be diminished or impaired.
22 Bender v. Anglin, 207 Ga. 108, 109, 60 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1950) states:
It would be an unjustified distortion of this general rule [pension as a gratuity]
to apply it in cases where the laws providing for retirement .. . compensation
are construed to require the recipients of such benefits to make valuable con-
tributions as consideration for the benefits to be received.
23 Kinney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 330 Mass. 302, 304-05, 113
N.E.2d 59, 61 (1953)
24 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 12.144, at 608 (3d ed. 1963).
25 Hickey v. Pittsburg Pension Bd., 378 Pa. 300, 106 A.2d 2.33 (1954). There the
pensioner had met the term requirement but not the minimum age requirement, and
his rights were held vested and no modification was allowed.
26 O'Dea v. Cook, 176 Cal. 659, 169 Pac. 366 (1917). This holding is identical with
the principal case only with regard to the time of vesting of the pension right. As will
be demonstrated below, the extent of the right so vested is strikingly dissimilar.
27 Kern v. City of Long Beach, 29 Cal. 2d 848, 179 P.2d 799 (1947) is typical:
. .. an employee 'may acquire a vested contractual right to a pension but . . .
this right is not rigidly fixed by the specific terms of the legislation in effect
during any particular period in which he serves. The statutory language is sub-
ject to the implied qualification that the governing body may make modifications
and changes in the system. The employee does not have a right to any fixed or
definite benefits, but only to a substantial or reasonable pension.
Id. at 855, 179 P.2d at 803. See also Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal. 2d 128, 287
P.2d 765 (1955); Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 438, 326.P.2d 484 (1958).
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The Supreme Court of Arizona in the instant case seems to have gone
further than any other court in the United States in contractually defining
and protecting the rights of the pensioner. In the process, it has necessarily
and completely eliminated the possibility of legislative modification of the
terms of the pension system prescribed by statute as it affects currently
employed pension members. It holds any such change unconstitutional as
affecting vested rights of the pensioner. This prohibition of modification is
absolute, regardless of the exigencies of the situation or the actuarial sound-
ness of the fund itself.
The position of the court is an extreme one. It emphatically espouses
the contractual theory of pensions. (This, of course, in itself, is not extreme,
but is merely the minority view.) It holds that the pension rights vest im-
mediately upon acceptance of employment. (And this fact is not singularly
extreme, as it has been pointed out above that the California courts hold a
similar view.) 23
 However, the court does reach a unique extreme when it
holds that the right thus vested is to the exact benefit fixed by the statute
in effect at the time the employee begins service. No other court in the country
has so completely eliminated the possibility of necessary legislative revision
of statutory pension benefits.
The court arrives at the necessity of a contractual relationship between
the municipality and the pensioner by means of a constitutional argument:
Given the existence of a state constitutional prohibition of gratuitous pay-
ments of any kind by the state,3° and given the existence of a functioning
pension system which is the result of a legislative act, the court presupposes
the constitutionality of the pension system. It concludes that payments of
pension benefits must be based upon constitutional grounds, or in other
words, non-gratuitous grounds. From this reasoning the further conclusion
is reached that the basis of this obligation is the contract of employment, a
"firm and binding"31 contract.
In reaching its conclusion, the court expressly overruled two of its
previous decisions concerning the same 1952 amendment to the act 32 and
criticized those decisions, because they failed to recognize the "firm and
binding contract" but spoke rather of the relationship in terms of "quasi-
contract" and "contingent interest." By those terms, said the court, "appellant
was relegated to a second-class status." 33 The court, as noted by the dissent,
28 Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, supra note 10, at 701, 296 P.2d at 540, states a
similar philosophy:
[By) the rule which we adopt here, the employee who accepts a job to which a
pension plan is applicable contracts for a substantial pension and is entitled to
receive the same when he has fulfilled the prescribed conditions. His pension
rights may be modified prior to retirement, but only for the purpose of keeping
the pension system flexible and maintaining its integrity.
See also Dailey v. City of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 733, 344 P.2d 718 (1959).
29 See note 26 supra.
3° Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 7 (1956).
31 Supra note 1, at 544.
32
 Robinson v. Police Pension Bd., 85 Ariz. 384, 339 P.2d 739 (1959) ; Police Pension
Bd. v. Denney, 84 Ariz. 394, 330 P.2d 1 (1958).
33
 Supra note 1, at 544. Police Pension Bd. v. Denney, supra note 32, had held:
While it is difficult to accurately describe .
	 the relationship thus created be-.
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rejected the use of those terms and chose the term "contract" instead, as a
means of giving fixed significance to the pensioner's status. By the very
adoption of this term, however, the court has become entrapped in the extreme
position of creating immutably vested pension rights.
The court holds that the common Iaw prohibition against unilateral
modification of an executory contract is applicable, and further states that
"controversies as to those rights should be settled consistent with the law
applicable to contracts."" But it is clear that although the court is quick to
recognize the common Iaw rules of contract modification, it is not so cognizant
of the rules of contract formation in adopting its contractual basis of pension
rights. Its approach raises the problem dealt with in Wisconsin & Mich. Ry.
v. Powers,35 which involved a railroad's claim of exemption from a rail-
road tax on the ground that it had built in an area in which railroads were
statutorily exempted. The exempting legislation was subsequently repealed
and the railroad was required to pay the tax. Portions of the opinion by
Mr. Justice Holmes seem relevant to the present situation:
No doubt the State expected to encourage railroad building, and the
railroad builders expected the encouragement, but the two things
are not set against each other in terms of bargain . . . The broad
ground in a case like this is that, in view of the subject matter, the
legislature is not making promises, but framing a scheme of public
... improvement. In announcing its policy and providing for carry-
ing it out it may open a chance for benefits to those who comply
with its conditions, but it does not address them, and therefore it
makes no promise to them. It simply indicates a course of conduct
to be pursued, until circumstances or its views of policy change.
It would be quite intolerable if parties not expressly addressed were
to be allowed to set up a contract on the strength of their interest in
. . . a statute, ... (Emphasis added.)"
This query may be put to the instant court's contract theory: What of the
common law requirement of contractual intent? Granted that the legislature
intended that some benefits be paid to the loyal worker upon termination of
his employment, and granted that the employee seriously considered the
pension benefit an important part of his decision to commence and continue
municipal service; nevertheless, can it reasonably be maintained that the
State of Arizona, by the Police Pension Act of 1937, purported to make a
binding and irrevocable contract with each employee to serve while the
statute should be in effect? It is submitted that such a contention is a good
deal removed from what was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties
at the time the police department applicant began service. It is further
tween plaintiff and the City, it would appear to be in the realm of a quasi-con-
tract with certain rights being given to the officer that must be respected. Sub-
ject though to reasonable modification and changes in the law by the legislature.
Id. at 398, 330 P.2d at 3.
84 Supra note 1, at 544.
35 191 U.S. 379 (1903).
36 Id. at 387
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maintained that this forced argument for the existence of a contract basis
for vested pension rights has led to a distorted and extreme picture of the
extent of that right.
In considering the extent of the vested pension right, the Arizona court
is professing to follow the case law of the minority jurisdictions, which hold
for limited vesting of pension rights, and permit modification prior to com-
pletion of the specified conditions, if that modification is "reasonable" and
"non-arbitrary." 37
 However, it is instead holding for unqualified rights, an
extreme position which cannot be justified by reliance upon the cited cases.
Actually, as the dissent points out, if this court had based its decision on the
cited cases and examined the changes made by the 1952 amendment, it would
probably have been compelled to find the amendment valid. An examination
of those changes shows that they are both reasonable and necessary. 88
This court, in attempting to circumvent the state constitutional pro-
hibition against gratuities, and in searching for a more definite-sounding ap-
proach than "quasi-contract," seems to have chosen the contract approach
as a "stark alternative,"3° and by that choice has been driven to some in-
evitable and regrettable consequences. Perhaps the court, in making what
should properly be termed a policy decision, for some reason found it
necessary to justify that decision in contract law. It is submitted that the
jurisdictions which were first to reject the gratuity theory of pensions used
the contract approach analogously to describe their non-gratuitous approach
as a theory of rights. The Arizona court has stretched the analogy too far.
A major consequence of this decision is that a municipality will now have
to underwrite the actuarial soundness of its pension system if it is one pre-
scribed by statute. This decision unrealistically holds the community pension
authdrity to the standard of a major insurance company. To perform such a
function adequately it would need a staff of statisticians and a battery of
mathematical computers. The probabilities of municipal growth, employee
requirements, future wage scales and a multitude of other intricate actuarial
factors would be added to the already substantial problems of municipal
management.
- The court has apparently failed to recognize the primary' purpose of any
pension system: to promote the general welfare of all the members of the
pension system and to prevent economic insecurity to their families. This is
done by providing old age retirement benefits as part of a mutually co-
operative effort. Unless a reservation is implied in the pension statute of the
power to reasonably modify the specific terms of that statute in order to
maintain a sound fund, the purpose of the fund becomes frustrated, and the
primary goal of providing benefits for all becomes reduced to providing
benefits for some at the expense of the entire membership. This court refuses,
to recognize a principle which would allow the pensioner a vested property
interest in the fund, protected from confiscation, which nevertheless may be
varied a few dollars either way if the circumstances so necessitate.
37 See cases cited supra notes 26 & 27. See also McQuillin, supra note 24, at 606-07.
38 Supra note I, at 548.
80 Spina v. Consolidated Police Pension Fund Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 403, 197 A.2d
169, 175 (1964).
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Judge McQuillin cites cases on the construction of pension statutes which
disfavor a strained and unreasonable construction° and urge that the con-
struction should protect both the municipality and the employee. 41
. . . 
the courts will consider the obvious purposes and objects sought
to be attained and will construe the language used, . to the end of
giving it vitality and efficiency in the accomplishment of such pur-
poses and objects. [Citations omitted.] Pension acts should be so
construed as to avoid an inequitable result ... favoring one member
over another.42
Pension planning is a long-range proposition. It seems unrealistic to
expect social legislation of the type here in question to be effective and,
at the same time, changeless and self-sustaining, over a period exceeding
two decades. Such an expectation seems unmindful of the rapid advances in
the social and economic order on which that legislation is founded. It seems
strange and strained to require actuarial precision from policy legislation.
DAVID A. MILLS
Labor Law—Unemployment Compensation—Work-Share Contracts.—
Department of Labor Indus., Bureau of Employment Security v. Un-
employment Compensation Bd. of Review.'—Claimant Lybarger, a chain
machine operator for Talon, Inc., was represented by Local 591 of the Inter-
national Ladies Garment Workers Union. The union employed a normal
seniority system until 1961, when economic conditions required that Talon
reduce its labor force. Instead of permanently releasing some chain machine
operators, union and employer agreed, through the collective bargaining
process, upon a "work-share" 2 plan under which the available work would
be apportioned among all of the operators. The workers with seniority
(seniors) would perform all the work until they earned $5,000, at which time
the remaining workers (juniors) would replace them. 3 Lybarger had grossed
$5,000 by October 1, 1961, when, pursuant to the plan, he was laid off despite
his expressed desire to keep working. He then applied for unemployment
40 McQuillin, supra note 24, § 12.143, at 596, citing Nelson v. City of Sioux Falls,
72 S.D. 73, 30 N.W.2d 1 (1947).
41 Id. at 597, citing People v. Swedeberg, 351 Ill. App. 121, 113 N.E.2d 849 (1953).
92 Ibid.
1 211 A.2c1 463 (Pa. 1965)
2 Theodore, Layoff, Recall, and Work-Sharing Procedures, 80 Monthly Lab. Rev.
329, 334 (1957).
3 The contract provision read:
Employees with sufficient seniority to remain at work shall be kept as operators
until the pay period when their gross earnings received from the company since
January amount to five thousand dollars ($5,000), plus-or-minus fifty ($50)
dollars. Such operators will then go on lay-off for the remainder of the year
or until all younger operators have been recalled, and additional ones are re-
quired in seniority order.
Supra note 1, at 464.
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